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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

FLORIDA PREPAID POST-SECONDARY EDUC. EXPENSE BD. V.
COLLEGE SAV. BANK AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
119 S. CT. 2199 (1999)

I.

INTRODUCTION

By striking down the Patent Remedy Act1 (“PRA”) as an unconstitutional
abrogation of states’ rights by Congress, the Supreme Court has severely
limited Congress’s power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment due process
clause.2 The Court has required that all future legislation be remedial, as
opposed to preventive. Thus, the Court has chosen to bolster states’ rights to
sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment3 at the expense of
individuals’ property rights and their right to due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment. The holding in Florida Prepaid Post-Secondary Educ. Expense
Bd. v. College Sav. Bank4 (“FPP”) will have long-reaching affects on
individuals’ property rights and their right to due process. Not only does the
Court fail to pay any deference to Congress, but it also sets forth a new
requirement that Congress identify a “pattern” of constitutional violations
before it may enact appropriate legislation pursuant to its Fourteenth
Amendment enforcement powers. After FPP, patent owners may have their
patents infringed by States without any due process.5 No patent owner can sue
a state in federal court without the state’s express consent.6 For those states
that do provide state remedies, due process is often found to be merely
illusory.7
This Note will first summarize the history and identify recent
developments in the area of law surrounding Eleventh Amendment sovereign
immunity rights of states and the Fourteenth Amendment rights of individuals
to due process. It will then discuss the majority and dissenting opinions in
FPP. Finally, this Note will examine the implications FPP will have on

1. Patent Remedy Act, Pub. L. No. 102-560, 106 Stat. 4230 (1994) (codified as amended at
35 U.S.C. § 271(h) (1994)) [hereinafter PRA].
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
4. Florida Prepaid Post-Secondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct.
2199, 2214 (1999).
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
485
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Congress’s power to enact appropriate legislation under section five of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Congress should not be required to identify a pattern
of constitutional violations as a prerequisite to enacting appropriate legislation
under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment.
II. BACKGROUND (DEVELOPMENT OF LAW)
A.

Sovereign Immunity - Eleventh Amendment

The Eleventh Amendment states: “[t]he Judicial Power of the United
States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced
or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or
by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”8 In Hans v. Louisiana, the Court
held that: (1) each state is a Sovereign entity in our federal system; and (2) it is
inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an
individual without its consent.9 Over the past century, the Supreme Court has
continually redefined the scope of Congress’s power to limit states’ Eleventh
Amendment sovereign immunity. The Court often failed to reach a consensus
on its interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment.10 Currently, the Court does
acknowledge that: (1) a state may “expressly” waive its Eleventh Amendment
sovereign immunity;11 and (2) Congress may in limited situations, after finding
a pattern of constitutional violations, enact legislation to abrogate states’
sovereign immunity.12
B.

Implied Waiver By a State of Its Sovereign Immunity

In Parden, the Court established the “constructive waiver doctrine”
holding that by participating in interstate commerce a State constructively
waives its sovereign immunity.13 However, the “constructive waiver doctrine”
8. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
9. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
10. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 3 (1989) (plurality opinion),
overruled by Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 66 (1996) (5-4 decision);
Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 224 (1989) (5-4 decision); Parden v. Terminal Ry. of Ala.
Docks Dep’t, 377 U.S. 184, 198 (1964) (5-4 decision), overruled by Welch v. Texas Dep’t of
Highways & Pub. Trans., 483 U.S. 468 (1987) (plurality opinion); Atascadero State Hosp. v.
Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 235 (1985) (5-4 decision).
11. College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. 2219, 2226 (1999) (companion case filed on same date).
The Court will generally find a waiver if the State makes a “clear declaration” that it intends to
submit itself to Federal Jurisdiction. Id.
12. See generally id.
13. Parden, 377 U.S. at 184. The Court permitted employees of a railroad owned and
operated by Alabama to bring action under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (“FELA”)
against their employer in federal court. Despite the absence of any provision in the statute
specifically referring to the States, the Court held the Act authorized suits against States by virtue
of a general provision subjecting to suit “every common carrier by railroad . . . engaging in
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announced in Parden has been expressly overruled by the companion case
Florida Prepaid Post-Secondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank
(“FPP’s Companion Case”).14 In FPP’s Companion Case, the Court held
there was a fundamental difference between a state expressing unequivocally
that it waives its sovereign immunity, and Congress expressing its intention
that if a state takes certain action it will be deemed to have waived that
immunity.15 After FPP’s Companion Case, Congress may not require a state
to constructively waive its sovereign immunity merely by participating in
regulated activities such as interstate commerce or advertising.16 But, a State
may still voluntarily waive its sovereign immunity by an unequivocal
statement of such intent.17
The four Justice dissent, in FPP’s Companion Case, is persuaded that a
state, such as Florida, engaged in interstate advertising of its products should
be deemed to have waived any defense of sovereign immunity in patent
litigation.18 When a state engages in commercial ventures that fall outside its
basic governmental obligation, the dissent believes that Congress must have
the power to require the state to waive its immunity to suit in federal court.19
The dissent asserts that the lack of such authority by Congress would create an
enforcement gap, that when combined with the pressures of a competitive
marketplace, could put the state’s regulated private competitors at a significant
disadvantage.20

commerce . . . between the States,” 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1940). The Court further held that Alabama
had waived its immunity despite the fact that Alabama law disavowed any such suit. Parden, 377
U.S. at 184.
14. College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2228. The Trademark Remedy Clarification Act
(TRCA) (see 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1998)) subjects states to suits brought under section 43(a) of the
Trademark Act of 1946 for false and misleading advertising. In FPP’s Companion Case,
petitioner filed suit claiming the respondent violated section 43(a) by misrepresenting its tuition
repayment program. Petitioner claimed that Florida waived its immunity by participating in
interstate marketing and administration of its program after the TRCA made it clear that such
activity would subject it to suit. The Court held a state does note constructively waive sovereign
immunity by participating in interstate commerce. Id.
15. Id.
16. See generally id.
17. Id. at 2233.
18. Id. at 2233-34. Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices Stevens,
Souter, and Ginsburg joined. The Dissent would not abandon the Constructive Waiver Doctrine.
If a State engages in activity from which it might readily withdraw, such as federally regulated
commercial activity, Congress should have the power to require the State to waive its immunity
from suit in federal court. Id.
19. Id. at 2235. When a State engages in commercial ventures, it acts like a private person,
outside the area of its core duties. It is unlikely that these non-core activities will prove essential
to the fulfillment of a basic governmental obligation. Id.
20. Id. at 2235.
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C. Congress’s Power to Abrogate State Sovereign Immunity
1. Article One “Commerce Clause Power”
In Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.,21 the Court held that Congress had the
power to abrogate state sovereign immunity under both its Article One
“Commerce Clause” power22 and its enforcement power of the Fourteenth
Amendment.23 In Union Gas, a coal plant worker, brought suit against
Pennsylvania for a negligent discharge of hazardous waste into the creek,
asserting that the state was liable for clean up costs.24 In response, the state
claimed that it was immune from liability under the Eleventh Amendment.25
The four Justice plurality reasoned: (1) the rationale of a decision reaching a
similar result with regard to legislation under section five of the Constitution’s
Fourteenth Amendment is equally applicable to the “Commerce Clause,” since
both constitutional provisions are plenary grants of authority expanding federal
power while restricting state power; and (2) to the extent that the states gave
Congress the authority to regulate commerce, they relinquished their immunity
and consented to suit where Congress finds it necessary.26
However, Congress’s expanded authority under its Article One
“Commerce Clause” power did not last long. In Seminole Tribe, the Court
expressly overruled Union Gas and held that Congress could not abrogate the
sovereign immunity of the states when acting pursuant to its plenary power to
regulate commerce under Article One of the Constitution.27 The Court
reasoned that it could not interpret its decision in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer28 to

21. 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
22. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“The Congress shall have the Power. . . to regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”).
23. Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 1. A four Justice plurality expressed the view that Congress has
the authority to render States liable in money damages in federal court when legislating pursuant
to the Constitution’s commerce clause. Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 14.
24. Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 3. The coal plant worker brought suit under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (“CERCLA”) (42 U.S.C. §§
9604-07 (Law. Co-op. 1980)) and the Super-fund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986
(“SARA”) (100 Stat. 1613 (1986)) that imposed liability on site owners and operators for
hazardous waste release. Both statutes were enacted by Congress pursuant to its Article One
commerce clause power. Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 4.
25. Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 5.
26. Id.
27. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 44. In a five to four decision, the Court held that Congress
had no authority to abrogate states’ sovereign immunity under its Article One commerce clause
power. The Court struck down the Indian Gambling Regulatory Act (“IGRA”) (18 U.S.C. § 2701
(1988)) which Congress enacted pursuant to its authority under the Indian Commerce Clause.
The IGRA gave Indian Tribes the power to sue states in federal courts. Id.
28. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
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justify limiting state immunity under provisions such as the Commerce Clause
that pre-dated the ratification of the Eleventh Amendment.29
2. Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
The Fourteenth Amendment provides in relevant part: “[s]ection 1. . .No
state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”; “[s]ection
5. . .The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article.”30
In Fitzpatrick,31 the Court held that section five of the Fourteenth
Amendment empowered Congress to enforce the amendment by appropriate
legislation, including the power to abrogate states’ Eleventh Amendment
sovereign immunity.32 The Court reasoned that the prohibitions of the
Fourteenth Amendment are directed at the states, thereby expanding federal
authority while limiting states’ powers.33
Several cases between 1985 and 1990 placed an additional requirement on
Congress to express unequivocally its intention to abrogate sovereign
immunity when enacting legislation pursuant to its authority under the
Fourteenth Amendment.34 In Chew v. California, an inventor from Ohio
attempted to sue California for patent infringement.35 Applying the Courts
decision in Scanlon,36 the Federal Circuit in Chew held that federal patent laws
failed to contain the requisite statement of unmistakably clear intent required to
abrogate state sovereign immunity in infringement suits.37

29. Id. See also Kristen Healey, Comment: The Scope of Eleventh Amendment Immunity
from Suits Arising Under Patent Law After Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 1735,
1751-52 (1998).
30. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
31. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
32. Id. A class action suit was brought on behalf of all present and retired males in the state
of Connecticut, claiming discrimination in the state’s retirement benefit plan. The suit claimed
the discriminatory retirement plan was in violation of the 1972 Amendments to Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Court held that Congress did possess authority pursuant to the
Fourteenth Amendment to subject states to suit in federal court. Id.
33. Id.
34. See generally Chew v. California, 893 F.2d 331 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Scanlon, 473 U.S. at
244-43; Dellmuth, 492 U.S. at 223.
35. Chew, 892 F.2d at 332-33. See generally 35 U.S.C. §§ 1 – 296 (1994) (dealing with the
patent laws).
36. 473 U.S. at 243-244 (holding that “Congress must express its intention to abrogate the
Eleventh Amendment in unmistakable language in the statute itself”).
37. Chew, 892 F.2d at 334. The Court required Congress to express its intention to abrogate
sovereign immunity in unmistakably clear language in the statute itself. Id.
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D. Federal Statute – Patent Remedy Act (PRA)
In response to Chew, Congress amended the patent laws to express its
“unmistakably clear” intent to abrogate the sovereign immunity of the states.38
Section 271(h) of the PRA now states: “[a]s used in this section, the term
‘whoever’ includes any State, any instrumentality of a State, and any officer or
employee of a State or instrumentality of a State acting in his official
capacity.”39 Section 296(a) addresses the sovereign immunity issue even more
specifically: “[a]ny State, any instrumentality of a State, and any officer or
executive of a State or instrumentality of a State acting in his official capacity,
shall not be immune, under the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution . . .,
from suit in federal court.”40
III. FLORIDA PREPAID POST-SECONDARY EDUC. EXPENSE BD. V. COLLEGE
SAV. BANK
A.

Summary Of Facts

College Savings Bank (“CSB”) is a New Jersey chartered savings bank
located in Princeton, New Jersey.41 Since 1987, CSB has sold certificates of
deposit contracts known as College Sure® CDs.42 The purpose of the College
Sure® CD is to help individuals save money for the unknown cost of college
education expenses.43 CSB guarantees returns sufficient to fund the uncertain
future cost of education.44 The College Sure® CD is administered using an
apparatus and methods disclosed in College Savings’ U.S. Patent No.
4,722,055, entitled “Method and Apparatus for funding Liability of Uncertain
Costs.”45
The Florida Prepaid Post-Secondary Education Expense Board (“Florida
Board”), a corporate body of the State of Florida, administers a similar
investment program aimed at aiding individuals fund the cost of Florida public
colleges and universities.46 CSB claims that the Florida Board directly and
indirectly infringed on CSB’s patent.47

38. See College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2203.
39. 35 U.S.C. § 271(h) (1994).
40. 35 U.S.C. § 296(a) (1994).
41. College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Post-Secondary Educ. Expense Bd., 948 F. Supp.
400, 401 (D.N.J. 1996).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. College Sav. Bank, 948 F. Supp. at 401.
47. Id.
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CSB brought an infringement action against the Florida Board in United
States District Court for the District of New Jersey pursuant to the PRA,48
which explicitly provides that states may be sued for patent infringement in the
federal courts.49 The Florida Board moved to dismiss CSB’s claim as barred
by Eleventh Amendment state sovereign immunity.50 The Florida Board
asserted that the PRA was an unconstitutional attempt by congress to use its
Article One powers, under the Patent Clause,51 to abrogate state sovereign
immunity and to expand the federal courts’ Article III jurisdiction.52 CSB
argued that the PRA was properly enacted by Congress pursuant to its
enforcement power under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment.53 The
United States intervened as of right,54 to defend the constitutionality of the
PRA.
B.

District Court Opinion

The District Court upheld the PRA, stating it was a valid exercise of
congressional power under the Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate state
sovereign immunity.55 In addition, the District Court held that: (1) the Florida
Board did not waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity by engaging in
interstate marketing and administration of its investment contracts; and (2)
Congress could not abrogate state sovereign immunity on Lanham Act
claims.56
The District Court reasoned Congress met both the requirements set forth
in Seminole Tribe,57 first, Congress has unequivocally expressed its intent to
abrogate immunity; and second, Congress had acted pursuant to a valid
exercise of power.58 The court found that Congress had revised the PRA to
make its intention to abrogate states’ sovereign immunity unmistakably clear,
and that the Fourteenth Amendment authorized Congress to protect against
state infringement of patent rights without due process.59

48. 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(h), 296 (1994).
49. College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Post-Secondary Educ. Expense Bd., 148 F.3d
1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
50. Id.
51. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
52. College Sav. Bank, 148 F.3d at 1346. See also U.S. CONST. art. III.
53. Id.
54. See 28 U.S.C. § 2403(a) (1994).
55. College Sav. Bank, 148 F.3d at 1346.
56. Id.
57. 116 S. Ct. at 1123.
58. College Sav. Bank, 948 F. Supp. at 420.
59. Id. at 421-22.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

492

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 19:485

C. Federal Circuit Court Opinion
The Federal Circuit Court affirmed the District Court’s decision denying
the Florida Board’s motion to dismiss the claim as barred by the Eleventh
Amendment.60 The Circuit Court held that Congress unmistakably expressed
its intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity for patent infringement suits
brought in the federal court pursuant to its authority under section five of the
Fourteenth Amendment.61 The Circuit Court did not address CSB’s arguments
that the Florida Board waived its sovereign immunity either by failing to raise
the sovereign immunity defense earlier in litigation or by participating in the
patent system.62
The Circuit Court reasoned that patents are property subject to the
protections of the Due Process Clause and Congress’s objective in enacting the
PRA was permissible because it sought to prevent states from depriving patent
owners of property without due process.63 Affirming the District Court, the
Circuit Court held Congress may abrogate a state’s sovereign immunity under
the Eleventh Amendment, only when Congress has both unequivocally
expressed its intent to abrogate immunity, and acted pursuant to a valid
exercise of authority. 64 Congress had revised the statutory language of the
PRA, in response to the Circuit Court’s decision in Chew,65 to unequivocally
express its intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity.66
In determining that Congress did have the power to abrogate states’
sovereign immunity, the Circuit Court cited both Seminole Tribe67 and
Fitzpatrick,68 stating that the Fourteenth Amendment “fundamentally altered
the balance of state and federal power struck by the Constitution.”69 Section
five of the Fourteenth Amendment grants Congress the power to enforce the
prohibitions of section one “by appropriate legislation.”70 Congress may use
any rational means to effectuate the substantive provisions of the
amendments.71

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

See College Sav. Bank, 148 F.3d at 1346.
Id. at 1346.
Id. at 1345.
Id. at 1349-50.
See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 55.
893 F.2d at 331.
See College Sav. Bank, 148 F.3d at 1347. See also 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(h), 296 (1994).
517 U.S. at 59.
427 U.S. at 455.
See College Sav. Bank, 148 F.3d at 1348.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
See College Sav. Bank, 148 F.3d at 1348.
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The Circuit Court also required a showing of proportionality between the
injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end.72 State
patent infringement causes considerable harm to the patentee and to the patent
system as a whole.73 Abrogation of state sovereign immunity, however,
subjects states to no greater burdens than those that must be endured by private
parties.74 Therefore, the PRA was found to meet the required congruence
between the harm to be prevented and the means selected to accomplish those
ends.75
IV. ANALYSIS
A.

Majority Opinion

Chief Justice Rehnquist announced the judgment of the Court and
delivered an opinion joined by Justices O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and
Thomas.76 The United States Supreme Court reversed the decision of the
Circuit Court, thereby holding that Congress’s abrogation of states’ sovereign
immunity through the PRA is unconstitutional and invalid.77 The PRA can not
be sustained as legislation enacted to enforce the guarantees of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.78
1. Eleventh Amendment - States Right to Sovereign Immunity
The Eleventh Amendment provides: “[t]he Judicial Power of the United
States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced
or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another State, or
by citizens or subjects of any Foreign State.”79 The Court interpreted the
Eleventh Amendment as early as the 1890’s to mean that each state is a
sovereign entity in our federal system, and “it is inherent in the nature of
sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without its
consent.”80
In determining if Congress validly enacted the PRA to abrogate states’
sovereign immunity, the Court agrees with the two requirements set forth by
the Circuit Court.81 First, whether congress has unequivocally expressed its
72. Id. at 1353. The circuit court held that if the means and ends lacked proportionality, then
the legislation may become substantive in operation and effect. Id.
73. Id. at 1354.
74. Id. at 1355.
75. Id.
76. See College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2201.
77. Id. at 2202.
78. Id.
79. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
80. See Hans, 134 U.S. at 13.
81. See College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2205.
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intent to abrogate the immunity; and second, whether Congress has acted
pursuant to a valid exercise of power.82 The Court agreed with the findings of
the Circuit Court in that Congress had made its intention to abrogate state
sovereign immunity via the PRA unmistakably clear.83 The PRA provides
“any state. . .shall not be immune, under the eleventh amendment of the
Constitution of the United States or under any other doctrine of Sovereign
immunity, from suit in federal court. . .for infringement of a patent.”84
The Court then turns to the question of whether Congress has the power to
compel a State to surrender its sovereign immunity. Congress asserted it had
the power to enact the PRA pursuant to three sources of constitutional
authority: the Patent Clause,85 the Interstate Commerce Clause,86 and section
five of the Fourteenth Amendment.87
2. U.S. Const. Article One: The Patent Clause and the Interstate
Commerce Clause
The Court, in Seminole Tribe. held that Congress may not abrogate state
sovereign immunity pursuant to its Article One powers.88 Therefore, the PRA
can not be sustained as a valid abrogation under either the Interstate Commerce
Clause or the Patent Clause.89
3. The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Congress retains the authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity
pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment.90 But the legislation must be
“appropriate” under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment.91 Appropriate
legislation requires that there be a congruence and proportionality between the
injury to be prevented and the means adopted to that end.92 For Congress to
invoke section five, it must identify conduct transgressing the Fourteenth
Amendment’s substantive provisions, and must tailor its legislation to remedy
such conduct.93

82. Id. (citing Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 55).
83. Id. The Court stated Congress’s intent could not be any clearer.
84. 35 U.S.C. § 296(a) (1994).
85. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
86. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
87. See College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2205.
88. See Seminole Tribe, 517 US at 72-73.
89. Id.
90. See College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2205.
91. City of Borne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 518-19 (1997) (the Court emphasized that
Congress’ enforcement power is remedial in nature, but that legislation may be constitutional
even though it intrudes into legislative spheres of authority previously reserved for the states).
92. See College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2207.
93. Id.
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The underlying conduct at issue here is state infringement of patents and
the use of sovereign immunity by states to deny patent owners a remedy for the
infringement of their patent rights.94 The conduct of unremedied patent
infringement by states must give rise to the Fourteenth Amendment violation
that Congress sought to remedy in the PRA.95
In enacting the PRA, Congress failed to identify any pattern of patent
infringement by states.96 The House Report identified only two examples of
patent suits against states, and the Circuit Court identified only eight patentinfringement suits prosecuted against the states in the past 110 years.97 The
Court found that Congress acted to prevent the speculative harm that patent
infringement by states might increase in the future, and not to remedy an
existing pattern of patent infringements by states without providing due
process to the patent owner.98
For Congress to have authority to enact the Patent Remedy Act pursuant to
the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress must find that a state has deprived a
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.99 The Court
determined that deprivation by state action of a constitutionally protected
interest is not in itself unconstitutional, it becomes unconstitutional when the
deprivation is without due process of law.100 A state’s infringement of a
patent, though interfering with a patent owner’s right to exclude others, does
not by itself violate the constitution.101 A deprivation of property without due
process only results where a state provides no remedy, or only inadequate
remedies, to injured patent owners.102
The Court determined that Congress did not find that state remedies were
constitutionally inadequate, but that they were less convenient than federal
remedies for purposes of uniformity.103 Aggrieved parties, in the state of
Florida, may pursue either a legislative remedy through a claims bill104 or a
judicial remedy through a takings or conversion claim.105 The need for
uniformity in patent law is important, but that is a factor that should be
addressed under the Article One Patent Powers rather than in a determination

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2208.
Id.
Id. (quoting Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990)).
College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2207.
Id.
Id. at 2209.
See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 11.065 (West 1997).
See Jacobs Wind Elec. Co. v. Florida Dep’t of Transp., 626 So.2d 1333 (Fla. 1993).
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of whether state sovereign immunity deprives a patentee of property without
due process.106
The Court focuses on Congress’s failure to identify a pattern of
constitutional violations, holding that the lack of such a pattern causes the
provisions of the PRA to be out of proportion to proposed remedial object.107
Therefore, the PRA can not be understood as responsive to, or designed to
remedy, unconstitutional behavior.108
The PRA subjects states to an unlimited range of liability, because
Congress failed to limit the coverage of the PRA to cases involving
As a means to meet the proportionality
constitutional violations.109
requirement, the Court identified three potential limitations to the Act: (1)
limiting the Act’s coverage to cases where a state refuses to offer any statecourt remedy for patent owners whose patents it had infringed; (2) confining
the reach of the Act by limiting the remedy to certain types of infringement,
such as non-negligent or infringement authorized pursuant to state policy; or
(3) only providing for suits against states with questionable remedies or a high
incidence of infringement.110
4. The Fifth Amendment: “Takings” Claim
The Court did not consider whether Congress could validly abrogate state
sovereign immunity pursuant its authority under the Just Compensation Clause
of the Fifth Amendment because Congress failed to expressly invoke its
authority under the clause.111
B.

Dissenting Opinion

Justice Stevens filed the dissenting opinion, with whom Justices Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer joined.112
The dissenting Justices believe that
Congress’s abrogation of states’ sovereign immunity via the PRA was
constitutional.113 The PRA should be sustained as valid legislation enacted to
enforce the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.114
The dissent emphasizes the fact that the Constitution grants Congress
plenary authority over patents and copyrights.115 Congress granted the federal

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

See College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2209.
Id. at 2210.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2208.
Id. at 2201.
Id. at 2211.
Id.
Id. (citing U. S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8).
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courts with exclusive jurisdiction over patent infringement litigation.116 In
1992, Congress enacted the PRA to unambiguously authorize patent
infringement actions against states or state agencies.117 The dissent asserts that
the absence of effective state remedies supports the conclusion that the PRA
was an appropriate exercise of Congress’s power under section five of the
Fourteenth Amendment to prevent state infringements of patents without due
process of law.118
1. Policy Requires National Uniformity - Governed By Federal Law
The dissent asserts that Congress’s Article One “Patent Power” is directly
relevant to this case because it establishes the constitutionality of the
congressional decision to grant exclusive jurisdiction over patent infringement
cases in the federal courts.119 While the Court acknowledges the need for
uniformity in patent law is important, the Court discounts its significance as
merely a factor to consider in the “Article I patent-power calculus” and refuses
to consider it in the determination of whether sovereign immunity deprives a
patentee of property without due process of law.120 The dissent disagrees and
asserts that Congress had the authority to vest exclusive jurisdiction in the
federal courts as well as to abrogate states’ sovereign immunity to federal court
jurisdiction.121
Supporting the need for national uniformity, the dissent asserts that there is
a strong federal interest in promoting the “constitutional goals of stimulating
invention and rewarding the disclosure of novel and useful advances of
technology.”122 Patent litigation often raises difficult technical issues that are
unfamiliar to the average trial judge.123 Inconsistent application of the patent
laws has lead to undue forum shopping and unsettling inconsistency in patent
adjudications. 124

116. Id. (citing Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610, 620 (1895)).
117. PRA, supra note 1.
118. See College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2211.
119. Id. at 2213.
120. Id.
121. Id. (the Dissent argues that the decision to vest exclusive jurisdiction over patent
infringement cases in federal court was appropriate, and that it was equally appropriate for
Congress to abrogate state sovereign immunity in patent infringement cases in order to close a
loophole in the uniform federal scheme).
122. Id. at 2212 (citing Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Crafts Boats, Inc, 489 U.S. 141, 162163 (1989) (stating for the proposition that federal interests are threatened by inadequate
protections of patents. Therefore, uniformity, consistency, and familiarity with the patent
jurisprudence are matters of overriding significance).
123. College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2211.
124. Id.
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2. The PRA Was a Valid Exercise of Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment
Enforcement Power
The dissent believes that the PRA is a valid exercise of Congress’s
Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power because it meets the test set forth
in Flores.125 Congress has met the required congruence and proportionality
between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adapted to that
end.126 The dissent disagrees with the constitutional distinction that the
majority draws between negligent and intentional patent infringement.127
Respondent CSB has alleged that the Florida Board’s infringement was
willful.128 Therefore, the question presented in this case is whether the PRA,
which clarified Congress’s unmistakable intent to subject state infringers to
federal court jurisdiction, may be applied to willful infringers. 129
The dissent believes that, prior to this case, no requirement existed for
Congress to identify a pattern of wide spread constitutional violations by the
states.130 The majority based its opinion on perceived deficiencies in the
evidence reviewed by Congress before enacting the legislation.131 Based upon
this perceived lack of evidence, the majority held the PRA unconstitutional
because Congress failed to identify a pattern of infringement by the states.132
The dissent finds the legislative record to have sufficient evidence of
constitutional violations by states because Congress heard testimony about
inadequate state remedies for patent infringement when considering the
PRA.133 Congress also heard general testimony that state remedies would
likely be insufficient to compensate patentees whose patents were infringed by
states.134 The legislative record referenced several cases of patent infringement

125. Id. at 2213. See also Flores, 521 U.S. at 520 (The Flores proportionality test is
essentially: “There must be a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented
or remedied and the means adopted to that end. Lacking such a connection, legislation may
become substantive in operation and effect.”).
126. College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2213.
127. Id. (the dissent disagrees with the majority’s rationale that patent infringement is
analogous to the holding in Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332-34 (1986), where the court
found mere negligence in a personal injury case did not deprive anyone of liberty without due
process of law).
128. Id.
129. Id. at 2212. See Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 162-63.
130. College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2217.
131. Id. at 2214.
132. Id. at 2210.
133. Id. at 2214.
134. Id. at 2215 (the legislative record references several cases of patent infringement
involving states, see e.g., Paperless Accounting, Inc. v. Mass Transit Admin., Civil No. HAR 842922 (D. Md. 1985) (cited in House Hearing, at 56); Hercules, Inc. v. Minnesota States Highway
Dep’t, 337 F. Supp. 795 (Minn. 1972) (House Hearing, at 51)).
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involving states, including Chew.135 The dissent believes that the decision in
Chew clearly supports Congress’s authority to enact the PRA because the
Federal Court did not require a determination of whether a patent owner had
any remedy in state court.136
Congress determined that state infringement of patents was likely to
increase.137 The dissent provides several examples where States, especially
state universities, have been involved in patent cases since 1992.138
The dissent finds it ironic that the Court would require Congress to review
the remedies available in each state for patent infringements, since Congress
had already preempted state jurisdiction over patent infringement.139 It is
reasonable for Congress to assume that such remedies simply did not exist. 140
3. Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment Enforcement Powers are
Preventive, Not Merely Remedial
The dissent finds Congress had sufficient evidence of actual or potential
constitutional violations to meet the standard set forth in Flores, that Congress
has authority to enact appropriate enforcement legislation under the Fourteenth
Amendment to “remedy or prevent” unconstitutional actions.141 The dissent
does not agree with the majority’s attempt to restate the standard to allow for
remedial legislation only.142 In Flores, the Court merely restated the principle
that Congress’s enforcement power encompasses legislation that both deters
and remedies constitutional violations, even if it prohibits conduct that is not
unconstitutional and intrudes into areas of autonomy previously reserved for
the states.143 The dissent distinguishes the PRA from the Religion Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA). The dissent asserts the PRA is remedial legislation,
as opposed to an attempt by Congress to substantively change the Court’s
interpretation of the Constitution. The RFRA was struck down because it was
an attempt by Congress to usurp the Supreme Court’s authority to interpret the
United States Constitution.144
135. College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2214 (referring to Chew, 893 F.2d at 331).
136. College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2214.
137. Id. at 2215.
138. See, e.g., University of Colo. Foundation, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 974 F. Supp.
1339 (Colo. 1997) (patent infringement action filed by University of Colorado); Genentech v.
Regents of Univ. of Cal., 143 F.3d 1446 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (declaratory judgement suit filed by
Genentech); and Ciba-Geigy v. Alza Corp., 804 F. Supp 614 (N.J. 1992) (counterclaim brought
by Alza Corp. against Regents of University of California).
139. College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2216.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 2217.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. (citing Flores, 521 U.S. at 525 (the Court held Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment
enforcement power is corrective or preventive, not definitional)).
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In contrast to the majority, the dissent finds precise congruence between
the means used (abrogation of state sovereign immunity in patent infringement
cases) and the ends to be achieved (elimination of the risk that the defense of
sovereign immunity will deprive some patentees of property without due
process of the law).145 The congruence is precise regardless if the infringement
of patents by states is rare or infrequent.146 If infringements are rare, then the
statute will only operate in those infrequent cases.147 But if a pattern of
infringement were to develop, then the impact of the statute will expand in
harmony with the growth of the problem that Congress is attempting to
prevent.148 Under either scenario, the PRA will have no impact on states’
enforcement of their laws.149 As a result, the dissent asserts that the PRA puts
states in the same position as all private users of the patent system, and
virtually the same position as the United States.150
C. Author’s Analysis
1. States May Deprive Patent Owners of Their Property Without Due
Process of Law
As a result of the Court’s decision in FPP, patent owners may have no
protection against state infringement of their patents.151 State sovereign
immunity provided by the Eleventh Amendment prevents a patent owner from
filing suit against a state in federal court.152 Currently, the patentee may be
deprived of property without due process unless the state has voluntarily
submitted to federal jurisdiction or the state has provided for a state remedy.153
If states fail to provide one of the above remedies, then a patent owner has no
remedy against state infringement until Congress enacts new legislation that
abrogates the state’s sovereign immunity.
2. Congress’s Power to Enact Appropriate Enforcement Legislation
Under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment is Severely Limited
The Court has severely limited Congress’s ability to enforce the
substantive provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment.154 By requiring
145. College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2218.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2218.
151. Id. the Court struck down the PRA as an unconstitutional attempt by Congress to
abrogate state sovereign immunity.
152. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
153. See College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2204.
154. See generally id. at 2211-18.
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appropriate legislation to be “remedial” versus preventive in nature, the Court
has handicapped Congress’s power to protect individual’s constitutional
rights.155 Section five of the Fourteenth Amendment authorizes Congress to
enact all “appropriate”156 legislation to enforce the substantive provisions of
section one of the Fourteenth Amendment.157 The express language of the
Fourteenth Amendment does not limit appropriate legislation to remedial
only.158 Over the years, the phrase “appropriate legislation” has been subject
to judicial interpretation. Initially, the Court’s interpretation provided a
broader definition159 of “appropriate legislation,” but the recent trend has been
to narrow the scope of appropriate legislation to remedial only.160 The Court
in FPP has narrowed its interpretation further by requiring Congress to identify
a “pattern” of widespread and persisting constitutional violations as a
prerequisite for appropriate legislation.161 Although language of this type has
been used in prior Court decisions,162 it has never been a prerequisite to
appropriate legislation.163
The Court is creating new jurisprudence by requiring Congress to identify
widespread and pervasive constitutional violations as a prerequisite to
appropriate legislation.164 Citing Scanlon, the dissent asserted that the only
requirement previously placed upon Congress to enact appropriate
enforcement legislation was that Congress make its intention to abrogate
states’ sovereign immunity “unmistakably clear.”165 But, in that case the Court
struck down the legislation as inappropriate legislation under section five of

155. Id.
156. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 192 (Second College ed. 1985) (defines
“appropriate” as “suitable for a particular person, condition, occasion, or place; proper; fitting”).
157. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
158. Id. (the statutory language only requires that legislation be “appropriate”, not remedial).
159. See Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345-46 (1879) (holding that any legislation enacted
to ensure compliance with the Fourteenth Amendment and to provide equality of civil rights is
appropriate under the enforcement clause). The Court also observed that the Fourteenth
Amendment was intended to be a limitation of the power of states and enlargements of the power
of Congress. Id.
160. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 326 (1966) (holding that in order to
enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment congressional action must be construed as
“remedial”).
161. See College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2210 (striking down the PRA because it did not
respond to a history of “widespread and persisting deprivation of constitutional rights” as
required to enact proper prophylactic Fourteenth Amendment legislation).
162. See Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 301 (The Court upheld the Voting Rights Act of 1965,
noting evidence in the record of subsisting and pervasive discrimination amounting to
constitutional violations).
163. See id. at 333-34 (the Court, however, did not require widespread and pervasive
discrimination as a prerequisite to enacting appropriate legislation).
164. See College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2217.
165. Id. at 2214 (citing Scanlon, 473 U.S. at 247).
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the Fourteenth.166 One deficiency with the dissent’s argument, is that once the
Court determined that the legislation failed the unmistakably clear intention
doctrine,167 the Court was not required to analyze other required elements.
Requiring Congress to identify a pattern of constitutional violations will
cause Fourteenth Amendment enforcement legislation to become more costly
and time consuming. For future legislation to be upheld, Congress will be
required to investigate and document a pattern of constitutional violations in
the legislative record to prevent appropriate Fourteenth Amendment legislation
from being struck down.168 Congress may only effectuate laws against state
patent infringers that do not provide state remedies or only provide inadequate
remedies. Therefore, the new requirement will prevent Congress from
enacting legislation enforceable against all states.169
The new requirement preempts Congress from establishing a Uniform
National Patent Policy that provides consistent protections against both private
and state patent infringement. Because Congress may only abrogate states’
sovereign immunity after finding a history of infringement without due
process, states that provide minimal state remedies for state infringements may
protect their right to sovereign immunity. Although the Court states that a
finding of inadequate state remedies would enable Congress to abrogate state
sovereign immunity,170 the Court fails to provide standards or examples of
inadequate State remedies.171 The lack of such standards leads to the
conclusion that any state remedy will be sufficient to protect the state from
abrogation of its sovereign immunity, or at least make it less likely that the
Court will uphold such an abrogation.
3. Despite the Court’s opinion, Congress Should Not be Required to
Identify a Pattern of Constitutional Violations as a Prerequisite to
Enacting Fourteenth Amendment Legislation
The Separation of Powers Doctrine provides the Supreme Court exclusive
authority to interpret the United States Constitution,172 while it empowers
Congress to enact appropriate legislation to enforce the Supreme Court’s

166. See Scanlon, 473 U.S. at 247.
167. Id.
168. See College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2207 (the PRA was struck down because the
legislative record only identified two examples of patent infringement suits against states).
169. Id. (stating where adequate state remedies are provided and followed, no deprivation of
property without due process may result).
170. Id.
171. Id. at 2207-8.
172. Marybury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
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interpretation of the Constitution.173 In Flores, the Court reaffirmed the
Doctrine by declaring the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)174 an
unconstitutional attempt by Congress to expand the substantive provisions of
the Fourteenth Amendment.175 Congress enacted RFRA, in direct response to
the Supreme Court’s holding in Employment Div. v. Smith, as an attempt to
overrule the Court’s interpretation of the Constitution.176 One of Congress’s
stated purposes for enacting the RFRA was to restore the compelling-interest
test177 that prohibited a state government from substantially burdening a
person’s exercise of religion unless the government could demonstrate that the
burden was in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest.178 The Court
struck down the RFRA because if Congress could define its own powers by
altering the Court’s interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, then the
Constitution would no longer be “superior paramount law, unchangeable by
ordinary legislative means.”179
In contrast to the RFRA, Congress’s enactment of the PRA was not an
attempt to usurp the Judicial Branch’s authority to interpret the Constitution.180
Congress passed the PRA as remedial legislation to protect patent owners’
rights from being deprived without due process of law.181 The Court has
interpreted the Constitution holding that patent infringement by states without
providing a remedy equates to a Constitutional violation under the Fourteenth
Amendment.182 Therefore, Congress has the authority to enact appropriate
legislation to prevent such deprivations of property without due process of
law.183
Despite the Court’s decision in FPP, Congress should not be required to
identify a pattern of constitutional violations before it can enact appropriate
173. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966) (stating it is for Congress to
“determine whether and what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth
Amendment,” and its conclusions are entitled to much deference).
174. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(b)(b) (1998).
175. See generally Flores, 521 U.S. at 507.
176. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that under the free exercise
clause, neutral laws of general applicability may be applied to religious practices even when not
supported by a compelling governmental interest).
177. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). The Supreme Court applied a compellinginterest test for purposes of determining whether a governmental regulation violated the Federal
Constitution’s First Amendment Clause. In applying the test, the court asked: (1) whether the
regulation substantially burdens a religious practice; and (2) if so, whether the burden was
justified by a compelling interest. Id.
178. See Flores, 521 U.S. at 515-16.
179. Id. at 529.
180. See College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2218 (the dissent argues it merely effectuates settled
federal policy to confine patent infringement litigation to federal judges).
181. Id.
182. Id. at 2208 (citing Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 125).
183. See Morgan, 384 U.S. at 651.
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legislation. The new requirement will have the effect of requiring several
patent owners to be deprived of property rights without due process of law.
Since the Court has already decided that state infringement of patents without
due process is a Constitutional violation,184 Congress should be empowered to
ensure that all patent owners are guaranteed a remedy for such a violation and
not just those patent owners that are fortunate to have their patents infringed
after a widespread pattern of constitutional violations has occurred. States
should not be allowed to infringe on private patents without providing some
form of remedy. It is illogical to require that several individuals have their
constitutional rights violated before Congress may enact legislation to prevent
such violations.
4. Where Does Congress Go From Here?
Congress must revise the PRA to meet the three requirements of
appropriate Fourteenth Amendment legislation, as set forth in FPP: (1)
Congress must identify a pattern of constitutional violations; (2) it must
express its intent to abrogate sovereign immunity with unmistakable clarity;
and (3) the means selected must be proportionate to ends.185 The Court has
failed to provide Congress with clear guidance on how to fulfill the first and
third requirements.
In regard to the first requirement, the Court has failed to quantify the
number of constitutional violations that Congress must identify before the
deprivation equates to a “pattern” of constitutional violations. In FPP, the
Court struck down the PRA even though it acknowledged that Congress
identified at least two incidents of constitutional violations.186 From the
Court’s decision in FPP, Congress can infer that a substantial number of
violations must occur before the Court will find that a “pattern” of
unconstitutional patent infringements has occurred. The ambiguity associated
with the Court’s interpretation of a “pattern” of constitutional violations may
prevent Congress from enacting any patent regulation legislation pursuant to it
Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power.
In regard to the third element, the Court provided three recommendations
of ways Congress could limit the statute so that the means selected by
Congress were proportionate to its ends.187 Of the three recommended
limitations, only the first recommendation appears practical without further
explanation by the Court.188 Congress could easily limit the Act’s coverage to
184. See College Sav. Bank, 119 S.Ct. at 2208.
185. Id. at 2206-07.
186. Id. at 2207.
187. See supra text accompanying note 110.
188. See supra text accompanying note 110 (the Court’s first recommendation was for
Congress to limit the Act’s coverage to cases where a state refuses to offer any state-court remedy
for patent owners whose patents it had infringed).
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cases where a state refuses to offer any state-court remedy. One advantage to a
limitation of this type is that it could be incorporated into the statutory
language without requiring Congress to perform an exhaustive investigation
into the types of remedies available in each state.
The other two recommendations do not appear to be practical without
further clarification because the Court has not articulated standards by which
such legislation would be upheld.189 For example, Congress cannot provide for
suits against only those states with questionable remedies, without the Court
first defining the types of remedies that are acceptable versus questionable.
Similarly, the Court has also failed to define what equals a high incidence of
infringement.
Based upon the Court’s interpretation of the three requirements in FPP, it
appears unlikely that Congress will enact any appropriate patent legislation
under the Fourteenth Amendment against states that provide a state remedy of
any type. Thus, many private patent owners that have their patents infringed
by states may not be provided any due process, or at best may receive state due
process that is often illusory.
Although the PRA has been held an unconstitutional abrogation of state
sovereign immunity under Article One and under the Fourteenth Amendment,
the Court has not yet decided if it would be upheld as a valid exercise of
Congress’ Fifth Amendment “Takings” clause power.190 Upon a general
review of the issue it appears that any attempt to ground the PRA in the
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment will fail.
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires that states pay just
compensation when property is taken for a public purpose pursuant to a state’s
power of eminent domain.191 In general terms, the Court will authorize a
taking when a state justly compensates a private individual for state
deprivation of his property, and the deprivation was for a public purpose.192
The Court will only find a taking if the state action causes a drastic reduction
in the value of the property193 or a permanent physical occupation by the state
exists.194 Since it would be difficult for a patent owner to prove a drastic
reduction in the value of his property or an analogy to a permanent physical
occupation, the Court would probably not uphold the PRA under a Fifth

189. See supra text accompanying note 110 (the Court’s other two recommendations were:
(1) for Congress to confine the reach of the Act by limiting the remedy to certain types of
infringement, such as non-negligent or infringement authorized pursuant to state policy; or (2) for
Congress to only provide for suits against states with questionable remedies or a high incidence
of infringement).
190. See College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2208.
191. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
192. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1000-04 (1984).
193. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
194. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
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Amendment Takings analysis. The Court would probably find patent
infringement more similar to regulation of property that does not require just
compensation. Associate Professor Thomas Cotter and Christina Bohannan
have considered the Constitutionality of the PRA under the Fifth Amendment
and assert that it can not be upheld as valid Fifth Amendment legislation
pursuant to the Takings Clause.195 Since Congress’ purpose in enacting the
PRA is to prevent states from making unlawful uses of patents, it is difficult to
perceive how Congress could forbid the states from effecting takings of
intellectual property and, at the same time, claim that it is enforcing the
Takings clause, which allows the states to effect takings upon payment of just
compensation.196
5. The Courts’ Trend Toward Restricting Federal Power
The broader significance of FPP is the radically new and restricted view of
federal power. When considered with the restrictions placed upon Article I by
Seminole Tribe, FPP represents the view of a 5-Justice majority that federal
power is much less extensive than had previously been thought. As Professor
Tribe has said, “the Court’s current dedication to a states’ rights doctrine seems
to be a free floating cloud that can rain on almost any source of Congressional
power.”197
ROBERT G. BRANDT

195. See Christina Bohannan & Thomas F. Cotter, When the State Steals Ideas: Is the
Abrogation of State Sovereign Immunity from Federal Infringement Claims Constitutional in
Light of Seminole Tribe?, 4 FORDHAM L. REV. 1435, 1458-69 (1999).
196. Id. at 1469.
197. Nina Bernstein, An Accountability Issue, N.Y. TIMES, April 1, 1996, at A1.

